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Public Energy 
Notes Toward a New System 
by JAMES RIDGEWAY and BETIINA CONNER 
Most proposals for reforming the energy industry are too limited. We need a whole new 
system-one that is accountable to those it serves. 
The energy crisis of the past yc~1r ~timulated a variety 
of political responses. Among the m0st interesting, in 
our view, were the protests of citizens: groups and 
con:>umer advocates over the skyrocketing cvsts of 
electricity. The number of such protests is sur-
prisingly large. ' 
In Atlanta, for example, the Georgia Power Project 
challenged rate increases, initiated lawsuits, and gen-
erally stirred up opposition to the Georgia Power 
Company. In Philadelphia, (he Strike Committee on 
Philadelphia Electric Company (SCOPE) organized a 
coalition of groups with a combined membership of 
nearly half a million to fight a proposed 21 percent 
rate increase. Citizens pledged not to pay their bills 
until SCOPE decided how and when. In Connecticut, 
an alliance of labor unions and consumer groups 
persuaded 20 percent of United Illuminating Com-
pany's customers to withhold the fuel cost adjust-
ment portion of their bills. A class action suit in 
U1ster County, New York, against Central Hudson 
Gas and Electric sought to declare the fuel cost 
adjustment clause illegal. 
In Rhode Island, the People's Public Utilities 
Coalition (PPUC), an ad hoc organization of welfare-
rights groups and unions, got 6,000 names on a 
petition opposing a fuel escalation clause, and so 
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impressed the state utilities comnuss10n that it 
employed PPUC to investigate utilities operating in 
Rhode Island. In North Carolina, the United Mine 
Workers allied themselves with citizen action groups 
to fight the Duke Power Company. The UMWA was 
attempting to organize Duke's Brookside mine in 
Harlan County, Kentucky; to bring financial pressure 
on the .company, it retained a firm of utility experts 
to funnel information to North Carolina Public 
Interest Research Group and Carolina Action, two 
groups that have intervened with the state utilities 
commission to block Duke's proposed rate increases. 
In Berkeley, advocates of public power, defeated 
once in a move to municipalize the facilities of Pacific 
Gas and Electric, geared up for a new campaign (see 
"Buying Power," by Thomas Brom and Edward 
Kirshner; Working Papers, Summer 1974). Across the 
Bay in San Francisco, a grand jury recommended that 
the city lease PG&E's facilities and run its own 
electric system. 
Measured against the entire energy-industry complex, 
of course, such groups represent limited opposition. 
For one thing, they have focused almost exclusively 
on electric utilities. The reason, no doubt, is that the 
utilities are the most visil;!le target for attack; and 
their decision-making processes are at least nominally 
open to public intervention through state regulatory 
agencies. It is harder to see how to attack an oil 
company. Picketing your local gas station isn't quite 
the same thing. 
Focusing on electric utilities means, however, that 
the objectives of most groups, even at their most 
radical, seldom go beyond "public power." Given the 
subordinate role of the utilities in the energy system 
as a whole, pubiic power per se has its limits. Most 
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utilities are dependent on the international oil com-
panies for their fuel, since the oil companies control 
much coal production as well as petroleum. If the oil 
companies decide to change their terms, it won't 
make much difference who owns the utility. In fact, a 
movement for public power could function as an 
industrial public-relations program, letting the "pub-
lic" agency take the blame for the high costs caused 
by the oil companies. Or it could turn out to be 
another case of the public bai1ing out a sick industry. 
When the federal government td<.e:, over rail service, it 
usually takes over the losing runs while leaving the 
profitable ones to private enterprise. The pattern 
could repeat itself in energy. The electric utilities are 
in fact beginning to hurt financially. So public 
take-over is a real possibility. But nobody is talking 
seriously about taking over the oil companies (though 
there have been proposals for a federal oil company 
to compete with them). 
Ultimately, public control over America's energy 
system will require control over fossil fuels. It will 
also require control over eneriD' planning and the 
introduction of new energy technologies. At present 
this control rests iargely in the hands of the major oil 
companies; to a lesser extent it rests with tne federal 
agencies that, historically, have been the oil com-
panies' handmaidens. Those who would change this 
situation cannot do so simply by challenging electric 
companies' rate hikes, though such challenges are a 
promising first step. Nor can they do so simply by 
proposing new forms of regulation at the federal 
level. Regulation has prpven ineffective in the past, 
and is likely to remain /so in the future. As long as 
control over the production and marketing of energy 
remains in private hand~, the corporations will have 
the information, money, and political power to tum 
any attempt at regulation into a charade. 
What is needed, we believe, is an outline of an 
alternative energy system. We need to propose plau-
sible ways of producing and distributing energy that 
rely neither on the large corppradons nor on some 
mammoth federal bureaucracy. Utopian projections 
of this sort, though they have their limitations, can 
suggest some practical approaches to changing the 
system we have now~ A sketch of such an alternative, 
together with some models and some implications, 
follows. 1 
Local Beginnings 
...A publicly controlled energy system, m our view, 
should be decentralized and democratically run. The 
heart of our plan involves creating a new· local 
governmental unit to establish and administer energy 
policy-the public energy district (PED). The district 
would be a new sort of municipal corporation, a 
political subdivision within a state. One model for the 
public energy district is the state of Washington's 
public utility districts (PUDs). These are public 
agencies responsible for the production and distribu-
tion of electric power 1 David Whisnant, in an article 
in People's Appalachia, describes how they work: 
In concept the public utility district is relatively 
simple. Normally a PUD law authorizes a publicly 
controlled body to issue revenue-producing bonds, 
receive and disburse funds, acquire real estate (by 
condemnation if ne::essary ), f:Onstruct dams and 
other power generation and distribution facilities, and 
sell electric power. Many PUDs in the Northwest are 
distribution facilities only, buying their power from 
the Bonneville Power Administration. All PUDs pay a 
speCified portion of their receipts into the general 
revenue funds of their counties. As nonprofit enter-
prises, they are able to supply electricity to their 
customers at about half the rate charged by private 
utilities, while paying off their own indebtedness to 
bondholders. 
The public utility district mechanism quickly 
proved capable of achieving spectacular results in 
poor Washington counties. Tiny Lewis County, with a 
population of 35,000 farmers, loggers, and cattlemen 
and no industry now operates a $2-mi//ion-a-year 
PUD which provides nearly a quarter of a million 
dollars a year in revenues for the county-including 
$125,000 per year to support its public schools. 
Chelan County, also quite small, started its PUD in 
1936 and purchased its first transmission lines nine 
years later. Within the next few years it bought out 
some existing power systems, built a 249,000 kw 
generating facility at Rock Island, and financed 
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construction of it.\ own Rocky Reach ,/am by sel!iw; 
$263 million worth of r~?venue bonds. The 800,000 
kw Rocky Reach project is a model cf acfi,1ily in the 
public interest; its powerhouse 1.'~'< 'rl includes t.! 
muselim of artifacts excavated durin;: construction of 
the dam. Power from Rocky Reach, ;;\lai!aole bv 
1961, attracted manufacturing insta!lati;,r:s by ,1fcoa. 
DJ:W Chemicc.l, the Vanadium Corporation. a.'i:.: 
diners. By }967, 2~ Washington PUDs were .\upplyil;g 
electric power to 280,000 customers. 
A public energy distnct woulct ~ir.1?;Y e>..(:?nd the 
idea of a public utility distnct. A PED, in theory, 
would have jurisdiction over tn~ proJuction and 
distribution of ali forms vf caergy in its locality. 
Voters in a proposed district couiJ rcques! a rCfer-
endum to establish such an agen~:y ;n a gencr.1l 
election. Directors of the PED would be elected at 
the polls as part of regularly scheduled elections; 
standards might be set for local gecgraphic and 
perhaps employee representation . 
' As we envision it, a public cncrg)r district wouid 
have the power of eminent domain but not the power 
to tax. Its revenue would come from bonding and 
from the operation of its facilities. At first, its 
functions might be limited. Eventually, it ~ould 
undertake rcsponsibihty for all aCtivities in its district 
having to do with the production and distribution of 
::nerwr. At that point it would produce oil, gas, coal, 
uranium, etc; build oii refineries; lay pipelines; 
operate and construct dcctric generation systems-:-in 
short, all of the functions now carried on by the 
different energy industries. At the same time, it 
would establish;and admirtistl!r ,overall energy policy 
for the area. It would set utility rates and priorities. It · 
would carry on research and development activities, 
and ~Jan the introduction of new energy techniques 
such' as solar collectors. 
Putting power:. and rcsponsibiiitiCs of this sort in 
the hands of one agency naturaily impiics a powerful 
;>olitical and economic organization. The PED, as we 
see it, would oversee much of its locality's economic 
development through its power to allocate energy. It 
would also have a good rieal of control over transpor· 
tation policies, environmental protection, employ-
ment patt¢rrts, and land use. The .control of energy 
provides an entry for public control in all these areas. 
Many of what we see as the PED's eventual 
functions, of course, presuppose immense political 
changes. Controlling the productton and distiibution 
of petroleum, for example, would ri1c:m supplanting 
or replacing some of the largest, mo;;t powerful 
companies in the world. This h !10t Jn immediate 
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ros~lOllity. But the advantage of such utopian sp.:!C· 
ulation is that it provides guidelines for policies that 
roay be practical tomorrow. Rather than a federal oil 
an<l gas corporation as was proposed last year, for 
instar.ce, we wouid advocate legislation that facil. 
itateci the creation of local oil and gas corporations, 
These could be un0erwritten by federal money, but 
they wo:11d be locally controlled, and they would 
intr~a: 'J·. ~, the idea of a local~y responsible public 
energy ,;l~:1i..:t. Over time, such limited agencies could 
ior;1; t:·:, ba<:, for the much more powerful public 
enr.rgy clistrict that we propose. 
R~:gioraa! Boards 
_i.ach public energy district would send a representa· 
tivc from its board to a regional energy board. How 
big these regior.s s.~ould be is open to some question, 
but they should be areas larger than a state. Already, 
for example, the federal government has developed . 
ten multistate regions for the purpose of admin-
istering its different programs. While these regions are 
arbitnry, they provide a u5eful starting point. • The 
regionai energy board might be organized along 
geographic lines that follow the ten federal regions. 
While the public energy district would administer 
energy resources on a day-to-day basis, the regional 
bo<lrd would allocate resources within the region and 
among be PEDs. · 
The Tennessee Valley Authority provides im idea 
of wh:n a rctP.onal organization might be like. Since 
its origins in 1933, TV A sought to mesh different 
aspects of resource planning, electric power, agri-
culture, industry, fertilizer production, navigation, 
J1ood control, recreation, and conservation. It con· 
,;ejved its immediate job as not merely to build dams 
rmd reservoirs but to put people back towork. This it 
did, r;ot contracting for the worker~ but hiring them 
directly. lt also built communitie{fqr its workers and 
tended •o their health needs. It reinforced existing 
•Not all [cdcral "re~ons," of. CQI!,rs.f;, .are similar. They 
induGe 6 large! "d<.:p7csscd area~" detined by the Economic 
Development Administration; 25 metropolitan administrative 
areas calied ·Federal Executive Boards; and 10 overall 
administrative regions which cover.thf: nati.cm and its terri· 
tories. U~dcr Nixon, the major emphasis was to develop these 
10 regions. The Departments of Labor, Housing and Urban 
Development, and Health, Education, and Welfare all were 
co;r.n.itt~d to similar regional co.nccpt~. and often had offices 
in the :.a me building in a given dty.J1Us city then served as a 
sort ,)f !<:~·j,>na: capital: Boston, New York, Philadelphia, 
Atlar.ta, n .. ::a,, Dem·er, Chicago, Kansas City, Seattle, and 
San Frm.;Jsco. Nixon set up a regional council where 
represent.1tive; ot' each involved agency had a seat. 
. 
. 
;,, _ _., ..• -.. .............. ~n~ ............ -.~.~ ... ---->l>.'l•·" 
' I '"'·:'. '• '•""""''"~: ... •. '• *· ... _.,...,, •'-· ·• 
48 
state and local governments by delegating taSKs to 
them on a contract basis. Its free technical services 
helped raise the level of state and local services. 
Even though it was entirely surrounded by hostile 
corporations (and though its support in Washington 
was never very firm), TV A became an immensely 
important economic force. Its electricity producdon 
program literally made possible the development of 
the nuclear industry. Without the vast quantities of 
power produced by the combined coal and hydro-
electric plants of the authority, the Atomic Energy 
Commission's uranium enrichment plants could never 
have functioned. In the process of providing thai 
electricity, TV A effectively reorganized the coal 
industry as welL As the single larg~st purchaser of 
coal in that region, it ir,troduced the concept of 
iong-term contracts and thereby contributed to the 
mechanization of mining. It also introduced a modi-
cum of sanity into the electncal utility industry 
through its interlinks with other private systems in 
the South and southeastern mountains. Despite the 
vitriolic attacks made upon TV A by private power, 
the agency, through these interlinks, made the private ' 
systems stronger and more stable. 
The tragedy of TV A is that it became too much an 
instrument of national economic policy. Its over-
nding objective at present is to provide low-priced 
electricity. It seeks out coal at the lowest possible 
prices, and hence trades heavily in strip-mined coal 
from Appalachia. Strip mining ruins the entire region; 
by buying the stripped coal, TV A turns many of the 
citizens of its region against it. The agency's role in 
nuclear development reflects this pattern of priorities 
too. TV A provided the electricity to enrich the 
uranium necessary for hydrogen bombs and nuclear 
power plants. In doing so it was answering the 
dictates of the national military, which was anxious 
to perpetuate nuclear technology, not the immediate 
needs of those who live in its region. 
Unlike TV A, our proposed regional energy board 
would be responsible not to Washington but to the 
local public energy districts that compose the region. 
The danger that it will be dominated by federally 
determined objectives is correspondingly less. There 
are, of course, other dangers. Local control is only as 
good as the local officials who exercise it and the 
context in which they operate. An argument can be 
made, in fact, that TV A would never have done much 
of anything if it was locally controlled, since "local 
control" would have meant control by local business-
men.2 Our plan, however, as.~umes that citizens care 
about what happens to ·energy £0soJrces---an assump-
tion that seems increasingiy plaus1ble. Tt also assumes 
!hat public agencies- the PEDs and the regional board 
itself--have sufficient power and revenues to be 
largely independem of private economic interests. 
Federal Regulation 
Finally, our plan proposes a na tiona! energy agency 
to coordinate the ideas and plans of the different 
regions. The agency's most important function would 
be to act as trustee of the nation's nawral resources, 
allocating scar..:...: resources to regions for distribution 
to localities. 
Eventually, all naturai resources of the nation 
ought to be public, and not given to any corporation 
for exploitation on its own terms. But, as with every 
other aspect of this plan, there need to be tran$itional 
steps. Here is one good example. 
Right now, a new national agency could take over 
from the interior Depz.rtment the administration of 
those territories already in the public domain (that is, 
areas specifically removed from commerce by the 
Congress for the purpose of the "general public 
good"). According to a common estimate, over 50 
percent of the fossil fuel energy resources of the 
United States are in the public domain territories. 
Some estimates place the figure as high as 80 percent. 
The Ford Foundation's Energy Policy Project esti-
mates that about one-third of the remaining domestic 
oil and gas resources are likely to be found in the 
outercontinental shelf, wnich is part of the public 
domain. In 1972, the outercontinental shelf lands 
produced I 0 percent of the domestic oil and 16 
percent of the domestic gas. 
Oil shale is almost entirely controlled by the 
federal government. About one-half the domestic coal 
in the West is under federal control. About 85 
percent of the strippab:t: iow-sulfur coal deposits are 
in the public domain. About half of the country's 
geothermal resources are on public land, and about 
half of the domestic uranium supply is in the public 
domain. And these estimates do not include the huge 
areas of Alaska that have already been leased by the 
federal government to the oil companies. Nor do they 
include state-controlled lands. 
One transitional scheme would be to place these 
resources-already in the fed,:ral domain and thus in 
one sense "nationalized"-under the control of the 
national agency. The regional boards then could make 
initial plans based on their shares of these resources. 
Eventually, the basic idea would be to widen the 
concept of public lands so that all natural-resources, 
including mineral fuel resources, were considered 
/._Eblic. 
RIIX;EWA Y -CONNER 
The national energy agency also should have, a 
planning staff that functions as a public research and 
development center serving the different regions. This 
staff would conduct the mapping ana resource 
estimates that now are carried 0ut by private in-
dustry. The agency would also take over functions of 
the Federal Power Commission and the other energy 
regulatory agencies. For instance, it would establish 
interstate rates and priorities for energy, and arrange 
for international trade. 
Transportation of energy is a critical factor in its 
control. As the history of the modern energy industry 
shows, again and again large corporate interests-the 
Standard Oil trust, its successor companies, the 
Morgans, Insulls, Rockefellers-controlled different 
sectors of the industry through control of the 
transmission facilities. Rockefeller initially built his 
monopoly through control over transportation. In the 
1930s, the Morgans and Rockefellers controlled the 
natural gas business by dominating the pipelines. In 
California today, the major companies control the 
industry by ownership of the pipelines. In electricity, 
brownouts and blackouts are due in large part to the 
inefficiencies caused by private companies' refusal to 
interlock their systems with public power systems. 
Ownership of tanker fleets, the largest navies in the 
world, rests largely with the seven major oil com-
panies. Railroads on occasion refuse to haul coal from 
one market to another, thereby contributing to 
shortag~s. 
Under the plan, all major int<:rstate en.:rgy trans-
portation facilities would be unde: direct control of 
the national energy board. The board might acquire 
control (51 percent of the securities) of the major 
~\ _,.- -. / / ) ' ) / 
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interstate natural gas and oil pipelines and electrical 
transmission systems in a process staged over ten 
years. During this ~riod, the energy board would 
lease and operate those portions of oil, gas, and 
electrical transmission systems necessary to transmit 
energy from public domain territories to the different 
public energy districts. The lease period would 
provide an effective test of the systems, and the 
energy board could determine which parts of the 
transportation lines could be ~d in its developing 
interregional system. At the same time, in the case of 
interstate commerce in energy transported by water, 
rail, truck, or airplane, the energy board would 
establi.m rates and prescribe national policy. 
Federal agencies, in general, can play a useful role in 
overseeing and regulating state and local authorities. 
Too often in American governmental history, though, 
federal bodies have come to dominate the state and 
local authorities they were designed to supplement. 
The energy plan we propose attempts to prevent such 
a development from the outset. Local public energy 
districts would have jurisdiction over production and 
distribution of energy within their areas and any 
energy commerce confined to the district. Regional 
authorities, in tum, would allocate resources among 
districts within the region, and control intraregional 
commerce in energy. The federal agency, finally, 
would regulate interregional commerce and allocate 
scarce resources as necesl.ary among regions. The use 
of higher authority in this way reflects our w1sh to 
avoid the emergence of local OPECs-Texas and 
Louisiana, for example, controlling the rates at which 
oil was sold to the rest of the United States. But the 
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lLwer of the higher authorities would be largely [regulatory. The work of production and distribution, 
iiU. most cases, would be handled on the local level. 
:·, 
~ 1.--"?"--r'--1~ 
Two additionai functions, however, would best be 
;.;.>rne<i out at the federal level. One is planning, and 
:he other i!l research and development. Agai~, they 
s.'lould be done in such a way as to increase rather 
than undercut local control. 
For example, tl1e feder~i agency envisioned in this 
pla."l would conduct routine, careful mapping of the 
nJtion's mineral energy resources, including geo-
?hvsical assessments, shallow and deep-::ore drilling, 
i!nvironmental tests, aerial and space surveys, map-
ping and testing of the nation's coal, and so on. But 
r.h.e actual work of doing this would be carried out by 
the staffs of the local energy districts, under contract 
with the federal board. Feder!al money for planning 
would be earmarked first . for use by local energy 
districts and secondly for use by regional authorities. 
Research and development would follow a similar 
,>aitem. At the moment, federal agencics-HUD, 
><ASA, the National Science Foundation, the AEC-
;ue hattling over who gets what in solar research. 
Whichever federal agency gains control then siphons ~:1e research money off to the institutions that 
surround it-universities, consulting firms, big corpo-
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rations, and so on. Under the plan, in contrast, most 
research monies would be centered in one federal 
agency. But again, the actual work of research and 
development would be carried out by the public 
energy districts (or in some cases regions) under 
contract with Washington. The PEDs would doubtless 
need to subcontract some of the work out. It might 
be a good idea to rank order the institutions eligible 
for thes..; ,~on tracts:: nohprofit institutions· within the 
district, nonprofit institutions within the region, 
smaller busmesses, and so forth. The presumption 
would be in favor of the higher priority organization; a~y if none had the required capabilities could the 
contract go to a larger, nonloCal corporation. In some 
cases, where the need was sufficient (e.g., the design 
and teS'cing of solar energy devices), federal funds 
might be used io set up local organizations capable of 
doing the work. 
A plan of this sort is utopian in the sense that it 
has no chan c.:; of being passed today. But today's 
utopias can become tomorrow's possibilities. This is 
particularly true if, as we believe likely, the energy 
industry continues to manipulate prices and policies 
to its own advantage--and to the disadvantage of 
everyone else. The energy crisis, as we have already 
seen with electric utilities, generates new political 
responses and thereby new political opportunities. If 
we can agree on the long-range objectives for a decent 
energy system we: will be that much closer to figuring 
out how to get tt'iere. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The plan outlined in this article grew out of a seminar on 
energy held at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washing· ton during 1974. 
,.2. See Peter Bame&, "Bacic-Door Socialism: Reflections on TV A," Working Papers, Falll974. 
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